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Abstract
Is it a matter of pure altruism or shortsightedness when a dictator spends an increas-
ing amount of his revenues for the population, while cutting on own consumption?
In order to be able to consume, the dictator ﬁrst has to stay in power. We present a
formal model of a power maximizing dictator. His revenues depend on the exports of
a single crop. With the export earnings the dictator buys loyalty from the producers
of the export crop by setting the domestic producer price. Revenues resulting from
the diﬀerence between the international and the domestic price of the crop are used
to ﬁnance a repressive apparatus. We characterize the optimal trade-oﬀ between
buying more loyalty and adapting the level of repression. The model is illustrated
with a case study of Rwanda under president Habyarimana (1973-94).
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Recently, economists and political scientists have narrowed the gap between their disci-
plines by articulating the interdependence of economic development and political power.
Economists realize that development does not take place in a political vacuum. And
political power cannot be studied without regard to the economy (Acemoglu and Robin-
son, 2001). The interdependence between economics and politics is particularly striking in
economies that depend for their foreign exchange earnings on the export of one or a few
primary commodities. According to the Food and Agricultural Organization (fao, 2002),
43 countries earn more then 50% of their total agricultural export revenue from one agricul-
tural commodity. They include Rwanda and Burundi (coﬀee), Ethiopia (coﬀee), Uganda
(coﬀee), Ivory Coast (cocoa), Malawi (tobacco), Mali (cotton), Kenya (tea), Ghana (co-
coa) in Africa and the coﬀee producing Latin-American countries Honduras, Nicaragua,
Guatemala and Columbia. A number of these countries have been ruled by authoritarian or
undemocratic regimes during most of the post-independence era. To give some examples:
in Ethiopia, a communist one-party regime ruled the country after the demise of emperor
Haile Selassie, until 1991; Uganda has seen a succession of dictatorships in the seventies
and eighties ; in Burundi the coup d’´ etats in 1966 and 1976 brought to power authoritarian
rulers; Rwanda was governed between 1973 and 1994 by a dictatorial regime.
The conditions under which political elites in such regimes prey on the citizenry or,
inversely, promote economic development, are the object of recent work in political econ-
omy. Lam and Wantchekon (1999) claim that resource abundance exacerbates the power
asymmetry between the populace and the political elites. The position of the political
elites is based on their control of the process of rent distribution. Other authors (Sachs
and Warner, 1995) have provided empirical evidence of the adverse eﬀects of resource abun-
dance on economic growth. Robinson (1997) argues that political elites in undemocratic
states do not promote development when they fear that this development will undermine
the political status quo and will ultimately deprive them of their power.
Should we regard dictators as power maximizing or revenue maximizing persons? Ba-
yart, Ellis and Hibou (1999) contend that political elites in many African countries are
mere networks for rent distribution that thrive on the export of primary commodities, on
drugs traﬃcking or on smuggling various kinds of goods. These elites care for their per-
sonal wealth. But these money making networks can only be maintained when the group
of proﬁteers, often identiﬁed by kinship or ethnic ties, stays in power. This is in line with
Tullock (1987) and Wintrobe (1998) who argue that, while some dictators care for personal
1wealth, all dictators must care for power.
In this paper, we present a political economy model of dictatorship in which we account
for the link between political power and economic activity. We rely upon a model of power
maximizing dictatorship developed by Wintrobe (1990, 1998). In this model, repression
and loyalty form the inputs in a production function for power. The dictator relies on
the loyalty of the population, but he also uses repression to stay in power. Loyal citizens
expect a return from their loyalty. A speciﬁc feature of Wintrobe’s model is the dictator’s
power to inﬂuence the level of his own budget: the more power he has, the higher the
budget he can command via taxation and expropriation.
In our model, the dictator’s budget depends on the value of his country’s export crop
on the world market. With the export earnings, the dictator buys political loyalty from
the population and ﬁnances repression. When the export earnings of an economy depend
on the produce of a large group of smallholders, such as coﬀee producers in Rwanda, the
dictator needs the loyalty of that group to stay in power1. He will therefore try to oﬀer
the smallholding producers a favourable price. But this may become diﬃcult if the world
price of the export crop falls.
In section 2, we reinterpret the Wintrobe power objective function as a power preference
function, rather than a power production function: it expresses the relative willingness of
a speciﬁc dictator to use repression rather loyalty, or vice versa, to obtain a certain level of
power. We are thus able to obtain a classiﬁcation of possible reactions of power maximizing
dictators to changes in the world market price of the export crop, in terms of a trade-oﬀ
between buying loyalty and the level of repression. We then apply the insights of the model
to the case of Rwanda, more speciﬁcally to the regime of Juv´ enal Habyarimana, who ruled
the country from 1973 to 1994 (section 3).
2 A political economy model
In the present section, we present a political economy model which allows a characterization
of dictatorial behaviour in a single crop economy, when confronted with variations in the
international price of that crop. The economy is characterized by a single export crop,
1The incentive to “care” for a large group of farmer-producers is largely absent in an economy endowed
with minerals or fuels. Once the dictator controls the mines or wells, he has few incentives to care for
the welfare of the large part of the population that is not involved in the mining activity. As long as he
pays the workers in the extracting industries a decent wage and uses the export earnings for his repressive
apparatus, he can stay in power.
2say coﬀee2, which is produced by farmers-cultivators. Exports are under full control of the
dictator. He obtains the (exogenous3) world price pm per unit of coﬀee exported. Farmers’
production behaviour is determined by the price, pp, they obtain from the dictator when
selling the harvest to him, and the repressive means, R, the dictator uses, among other
things, to enforce coﬀee production, such as the legal prohibition to uproot coﬀee trees.
Total coﬀee output, C, is therefore assumed to be positively related to both the price
farmers obtain, pp, and to the level of repression, R, applied by the dictator. Formally, we
model this type of behaviour by a reduced form aggregative production function:







where K is assumed to be twice continuously diﬀerentiable and concave. Let K(0;0) = 0.
Inﬂuencing the output of coﬀee by repressive means is however not without cost and has to
be ﬁnanced from the dictator’s budget. The latter is composed of the (possibly negative4)
net returns from coﬀee exports, (pm¡pp)C, and other ﬁnancial means, M, e.g tax revenues,
foreign loans or aid. Marketing costs could be included by subtracting a constant term
from pm. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we do not do this. Financial costs
associated with the level of repression, R, are denoted by pRR, where pR is the cost of an
additional unit of repression5. Putting things together, we obtain the following expression
for the dictator’s budget constraint:
M + (pm ¡ pp)C = pRR: (2)
Together with the production function (1), the budget constraint (2) constitutes the con-
straints on the dictator’s objective, which is to maximize his power6. For future reference,
2Coﬀee is the single export crop in the case of Rwanda. But the model is more generally applicable,
we believe. It can also be applied to an economy with a single labour intensive export industry. In that
case, the price farmers obtain should be replaced by the (ﬁxed) wage paid by the national authorities to
the workers in that industry.
3The dictatorship economy is assumed to be a price taker on a world scale.
4Occasionally, the dictator can decide to subsidize coﬀee production by paying a price pp to the farmers
which exceeds the international price level pm.
5The cost of repression is kept ﬁxed throughout the analysis and could be normalized to 1. Only the
unit repression cost relative to international and domestic coﬀee prices matters. But we feel the exposition
below becomes more transparent when expressing everything in ‘common’ monetary units.
6Wintrobe (1998) indicates that dictatorial behaviour is most often a combination of trying to remain
in power and rent seeking (tin pot dictatorship). However, we believe that the objective of staying in
power reveals more about the decisions dictators in many African countries make, when faced with the
choice between promoting loyalty and using repression.
3we will put both constraints together in the following expression:
M + (pm ¡ pp)K(pp;R) = pRR: (3)
Notice that this is a nonlinear constraint7 in the instruments of the dictator to realize his
objective, i.e. the coﬀee price, pp, and the level of repression, R.
It is useful to introduce the so-called shadow cost or virtual price of both instruments
for the dictator. These reﬂect the true cost to the dictator of raising the coﬀee price, pp,
and the level repression, R, by one unit. It contains a direct eﬀect: raising the coﬀee price
at given production level C, raises the cost by C units, while the direct cost eﬀect of raising
the level of repression, R, with one unit equals its unit cost, pR. But, contrary to the usual
linear case, there is an indirect eﬀect too, which runs through the (positive) eﬀect of both
instruments on production. As long as the international price pm exceeds the price paid to
coﬀee growers, pp, this indirect eﬀect reduces the shadow cost: the dictator earns back part
of the additional costs resulting from a higher domestic coﬀee price, for example, through
the increased revenues from the additional exports which become available as the result of
the higher domestic coﬀee price. That gain is formally equal to (pm¡pp) @K
@pp. An analogous
argument applies to an increase in the level of repression. Formally, these shadow costs,
denoted by v1 for the domestic coﬀee price, and v2 for repression, are deﬁned by means of
a ﬁrst order Taylor approximation of the budget constraint, M » = v1pp + v2R. Carrying
out the necessary calculations then gives:








In order to guarantee the existence of an internal optimum for the maximization problem
below, we assume that both v1 and v2 are positive, for any relevant realization of R and
pp.
The dictator’s objective to maximize his power critically depends on the amount of
loyalty he can buy from his subjects, and the level of repression he applies. Buying loyalty
is accomplished by setting the price pp paid to the farmers for coﬀee: the higher the price
the lower the probability that people will start grumbling, and for a high enough price,
7Concavity of K guarantees convexity of the constraint set as long as pm ¸ pp. If the latter condition
is not satisﬁed, there might be non-convexities in the constraint set. However, this will not aﬀect the
analysis below, as long as the optimum lies in the interior of the constraint set. One should merely check
whether the second order conditions for a maximum are satisﬁed.
4they will be supportive of ‘their’ dictator. Repression, on the other hand, is interpreted
here as the set of all independent measures a dictator can take to force his subjects into a
behaviour which increases his power, or refrain them from acts of opposition, which would
lead to the contrary8. Formally, the dictator’s objective can therefore be represented by
a function ¼ depending positively on the coﬀee price, pp, and on the level of repression
applied by the dictator, R:







In the sequel, ﬁrst and second partial derivatives of ¼, will be written as ¼pp;¼R and
¼pppp;¼ppR;¼Rpp and ¼RR.
We want to stress that the function ¼ is not a purely technical one, reﬂecting which
combinations of the coﬀee price and repression give a certain level of power, irrespective of
the dictator’s personality. On the contrary, the slope of the indiﬀerence curve (representing
the couples (pp;R) which result in a given level of power) reﬂects the type of dictator the
people are confronted with. Flatter indiﬀerence curves in the (pp;R)-plane, reveal that
a dictator is more eager to use repression to stay in power than a colleague with steeper
indiﬀerence curves. Because of this preference aspect associated with the power function,
we feel justiﬁed to make the regularity assumptions which are familiar from preference
characterizations: twice continuous diﬀerentiability and strong quasi-concavity. A formal
deﬁnition of the latter property can be found in the appendix.
The dictator is assumed to maximize his power using his two instruments, the domestic
coﬀee price, pp, and repression, R, subject to the budget and coﬀee production constraints,




s.t. M + (pm ¡ pp)K(pp;R) = pRR:
(max)
We denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint in this maximization
problem as ¸.
The ﬁrst order necessary conditions for an interior optimum are:
¼pp ¡ ¸v1 = 0; (6:a)
¼R ¡ ¸v2 = 0; (6:b)
8Since it includes repressive measures to increase coﬀee production, the level of repression, R, also
appears as an argument in the coﬀee production function, K.
5and the constraint set characterized by equation (3).







stating that for a dictator to maximize his power, the ratio of the marginal contribution
to his power of one dollar spent on loyalty by raising the purchasing price of coﬀee to the
marginal contribution to power of one additional unit of repression, should equal the ratio
of their respective shadow costs.
In the remainder of this section, we construct a typology of dictatorial behaviour engen-
dered by the model just presented. We therefore concentrate on the reactions a dictator can
exhibit in the optimal mix of buying loyalty and repression to stay in power, to changes in
the world market price, pm. In the appendix we derive, by means of a standard comparative































































A changing world price in the ﬁrst place generates a direct income eﬀect on the optimal
domestic coﬀee price and the – from the dictator’s point of view – optimal level of repres-
sion. This direct income eﬀect is represented by the ﬁrst terms at the RHS of respectively
equations (8) and (9). Indeed, the budget equation (2) shows that an increase in the world
price of coﬀee makes additional revenues available that can be spent on buying additional
loyalty or repression. In the sequel we will maintain the assumption that both the coﬀee
price and repression are normal ‘goods’, meaning that these variables will increase if the













> 0. These income eﬀects
are measured without taking into account the eﬀect of income, M, on coﬀee production,







, i.e. the income eﬀect is measured while keeping the
coﬀee production constant.
The second and third terms at the RHS of equations (8) and (9) reﬂect the impact of a
change in the international coﬀee price through its eﬀect on the relative shadow cost of
coﬀee and repression. Indeed, a change in the world coﬀee price aﬀects the slope of the
budget equation, because the shadow cost of buying additional loyalty through raising the
producer price relative to the shadow cost of repression has changed. This change in the
relative shadow cost, in its turn, causes substitution eﬀects (e.g. the change of pp due to
6a change in the virtual price vi, keeping the dictator’s level of power constant), reﬂected













, i = 1;2. In the appendix we show that the classical results














Furthermore, we show in the appendix that the cross substitution eﬀects are necessarily
positive. Repression and buying loyalty are said to be substitutes: an increase in the
shadow cost of repression leads to a substitution of loyalty for repression, while keeping














These substitution eﬀects are combined with the change in the shadow cost of loyalty
through changes in the domestic coﬀee price and in the level of repression, which can be













Consequently, the global own substitution eﬀects (the second terms at the RHS of equa-
tions 8 and 9) of an increase in the world coﬀee price, pm, on pp and R are positive, while
the cross eﬀects (the third terms at the RHS of equations 8 and 9) are negative.
Finally, the terms w1 and w2 reﬂect second round eﬀects on the shape of the boundary of
the constraint set, which act through the change in the slope of the production frontier (1)
resulting from a change in domestic coﬀee price and the level of repression during the ﬁrst
round. We assume that these eﬀects, which depend on ﬁrst and second derivatives of the
reduced form production function, K, will never be dominant. By this we mean that the













































@pm ¸ (·) 0: (11:2)
The single direction of the implication and the switch between strong and weak inequalities
give more content to the meaning of the non-dominant character of the production side
eﬀects, w1 and w2: these are assumed to be small enough in absolute value not to cause a
switch in sign of the eﬀect of a changing international coﬀee price on the optimal domestic
price and the optimal level of repression.
We are now able to characterize the dictator’s optimal behaviour as follows:
7Proposition Assume that both the domestic coﬀee price paid to producers, pp, and re-
pression, R, are normal goods, and the eﬀects of pp and R on coﬀee production, C, are
relatively small. Then,
1. if it is optimal for the dictator to react to a decreasing world price of coﬀee, pm, by
increasing the domestic coﬀee price, pp, he cannot simultaneously raise the level of
repression, R.
2. if it is optimal for the dictator to react to a decreasing world price of coﬀee, pm,
by increasing the level of repression, R, he cannot simultaneously raise the domestic
coﬀee price, pp.
3. if a decreasing world price of coﬀee, pm, leads to a decrease in the domestic coﬀee
price, pp, in the dictator’s optimum, it might be optimal to increase or decrease the
level of repression, R, depending on the structure of the power function ¼.
Proof: see appendix.
This proposition allows us to provide a typology of dictatorial behaviour along the lines
represented in table 1 below. A few words on how to read this table. One always starts
from a strict inequality. Take e.g. column 2: if, following an increase of the world price, the
dictator raises the domestic coﬀee price, either repression is not increased simultaneously
(upper case of column 2), in which case we have a dictator who relies on benevolent means
(buying loyalty) to stay in power, or the dictator increases also the level of repression
(lower case of column 2), in which case the dictator combines buying more loyalty with
more repression. We label the latter as a ‘totalitarian dictatorship’. Note that a benevolent
dictator trades oﬀ loyalty for more repression when the international price decreases. We
call this the ‘bad side’ of the benevolent dictator. We continue the discussion of benevolent
dictatorship assuming a fall of the world price of coﬀee as this will be the case in large parts
of the empirical application in section 3. The reasoning can easily be adapted for the case
that the international price rises. We turn now to the deﬁnition of constrained benevolent
dictatorship (upper case of column 2 with brackets). As suggested we start reading from
the strict inequality, in casu the dictator chooses to raise the level of repression following
a decrease in the international coﬀee price. Conditional upon his choice to use more
repression when the international price decreases, he can no longer choose to increase the
domestic price. Otherwise, he would end up in the upper left part of the table which is






@pm · (<)0 – (constrained)
benevolent dictatorship
@R
@pm > (¸)0 (constrained)
tyrannic dictatorship totalitarian dictatorship
The label ‘constrained’ corresponds to brackets in row and column headings.
not a viable strategy for the dictator according to our model. Therefore his benevolent
behaviour is said to be constrained. In other words, the constrained benevolent dictator
uses more repression when the world coﬀee price declines, which, because of budgetary
reasons, necessarily implies that the domestic price paid to the producers will not rise9.
Turn now to the ﬁrst column of table 1. We have shown that, if the dictator maximizes
his power, he cannot simultaneously decrease the domestic coﬀee price and the level of
repression, when the international price rises (upper part). So, suppose we observe an
increased level of repression when the world coﬀee price rises. If the dictator does not
simultaneously increase the domestic price, we say he is a tyrant (lower part of the ﬁrst
column). If he would raise the domestic coﬀee price, we end up again in the totalitarian
case (using both more repression and buying more loyalty). Finally, when we observe a
decrease in the domestic price following an increase in the international coﬀee price, the
dictator cannot choose to decrease repression, and therefore we say he is constrained to be
a tyrant10.
9The diﬀerence between the behaviour of constrained benevolent and benevolent dictators can be ob-
served if a decreasing world price is accompanied by a constant repression level and a decreasing domestic
price. In that case, the behaviour of a benevolent dictator (keeping repression constant while lowering
the domestic prices, following a decrease in international prices) is not the same as the behaviour of a
constrained benevolent dictator, who would raise the level of repression while not increasing the domestic
price. Constrained benevolence applies for sure if we observe a decreasing international price combined
with an increase in the level of repression and no change at all in the domestic prices.
10Similarly to the case of constrained versus ordinary benevolence, constrained tyrannic behaviour can
be distinguished from ordinary tyranny only if we observe a constant repression level and a decreasing
domestic price when the world coﬀee price rises (constrained tyranny) or a constant domestic price level
9Again, a fall of the world coﬀee price would induce a tyrant to substitute loyalty for
repression, rather than the other way around. When tides are bad, the tyrant shows his
‘good’ side. The assumption of twice continuous diﬀerentiability of ¼ does not allow for
a-symmetric reactions on international price changes. For example, within the framework
of this model it is impossible to meet a dictator who increases repression both when inter-
national prices decline and increase, starting from a given level of other ﬁnancial means, M,
and of the international coﬀee price, pm. Nevertheless the latter behaviour might resemble
closer the use of the term ‘tyrant’ in ordinary language.
But remark that benevolence and tyrannic dictatorship, as characterized here, are local
properties. This means that a dictator can behave as a tyrant starting from a given combi-
nation (M;pm) and as a benevolent dictator starting from another combination (M0;p0
m).
The classiﬁcation of dictatorial behaviour into tyranny, totalitarian or benevolent dicta-
torship can therefore depend on the policy environment, i.e. the level of the world coﬀee
price and the availability of other revenues.
3 Case study: coﬀee and power in Rwanda
3.1 Dictatorship and the coﬀee economy in Rwanda
In the present section we investigate whether the model developed in section 2 can shed
some light on the strategic choices of the Habyarimana dictatorship (1973-1994) in Rwanda
between buying loyalty, by increasing the domestic coﬀee paid to the farmers, and the
implementation of repressive policies in order to stay in power, during an era of declining
international coﬀee prices starting around 1978.
The Rwandese economy certainly ﬁts in the picture of a single export crop economy.
Coﬀee exports during the Habyarimana regime (1973-1994) accounted for 60 to 80% of
export revenues, depending on annual output and world market prices. The leading mem-
bers of the inner circle around the president (they were called Akazu) were in charge of
ocir-caf´ e, the state-run coﬀee agency. During the years when the regime had to establish
its power (1974-1977), the world market price for coﬀee was relatively high, with a peak
in 1977. The Habyarimana regime could aﬀord to pay a relatively high producer price
to the farmers, without aﬀecting its revenues. The diﬀerence between the domestic price
paid to the peasants and the world market price was substantial and the regime, by means
and an increased level of repression (ordinary tyranny).
10of the monopoly coﬀee marketing board, ocir-caf´ e, derived large amounts of budgetary
resources from coﬀee exports.
During the ﬁrst half of the eighties (1981-1985) the international coﬀee price expressed
in us dollar cents remained relatively stable, and this was, apparently, mirrored in a con-
stant nominal coﬀee price paid to the producers, without major changes in the level of
repression during that era. At the end of the eighties and during the early nineties (1988-
1993) the Habyarimana dictatorship came under a double pressure. Firstly, the collapse of
world market prices in 1987 and 1989 induced the regime to lower the domestic price paid
to the farmers. This loss hit the farmers hard since they were already paying a number
of taxes and retributions such as water taxes, health taxes, school fees. Secondly, politi-
cal opposition to the regime got more organized. This coincided with the invasion of the
Rwandese Patriotic Front (rpf) in October 1990. The question how to stay in power,
therefore, became one of the central issues of the Habyarimana regime. This issue deserves
more attention than the trade-oﬀ between consumption and power, or the pure rent seeking
model of dictatorship (Wintrobe, 1998) in order to gain a better understanding of what
happened at the end of Habyarimana’s regime11.
We will argue that the Habyarimana regime ﬁts by and large the picture of a benevolent
dictatorship that shows its bad side: increasing the level repression while cutting on the
peasants’ budget was a crucial feature of the way in which Habyarimana faced this double
pressure during the late eighties and early nineties. The picture of a benevolent dictator
who relies on buying loyalty rather than repression when he can aﬀord it, is well in line
with the peasant ideology which was developed by Habyarimana to justify his regime,
as was analysed by one of us (Verwimp, 2000). But despite this ideology, it should be
borne in mind that the benevolent dictator will substitute repression for loyalty when
the world price of the country’s export crop declines. There is also prima facie evidence
for the argument that the benevolent character of Habyarimana’s dictatorship developed
only over the years. At the very beginning of his regime, when he had to establish his
rule, Habyarimana exhibited rather totalitarian characteristics. Finally, there are some
exceptional years (1981, 1984, 1988, 1991 and 1993) during which tyrannical traits emerge
11In Wintrobe’s classiﬁcation, totalitarian dictatorship is characterized by trying to maximize both own
consumption and power simultaneously, in contrast with a dictator who substitutes power for consumption,
or the reverse. Verwimp (2003) adapted the Wintrobe reduced form model of totalitarian dictatorship to
investigate the coﬀee policy under the Habyarimana regime. In the present paper, we single out the power
maximizing objective from the Verwimp model, which allows to get a more detailed picture of the strategic
choice between loyalty and repression to obtain power.
11in Habyarimana’s behaviour.
3.2 A short analysis of the coﬀee price evolution
It should be stressed that the model of section 2 does not satisfy homogeneity: converting
all prices into a diﬀerent monetary unit would not be neutral for the results. Some care
should therefore be taken in deciding what is the appropriate unit for analysing the data.
The central issue in the model of the previous section was the trade-oﬀ between the level
of repression and of loyalty in order to maximize power. Loyalty was bought by means of
providing the peasants with purchasing power. Furthermore, the means used by the Hab-
yarimana regime to execute its repressive policy were mainly domestic. Even the genocide
was in the ﬁrst place executed with domestic sources, to wit the physical power of young
males armed with farming equipment. Therefore – and in line with standard microeco-
nomic models – monetary units should be expressed in constant domestic prices. Indeed,
the dollar value which the dictator obtains through coﬀee exports should be expressed in
terms of the amount of loyalty (peasant’s purchasing power) and repression he can aﬀord
with those revenues.
There are three factors which explain variations in the world coﬀee price12 expressed
in constant Rwandese francs (rwf): changes in the dollar price on the international coﬀee
market, variations in the bilateral exchange rate between the dollar and the Rwandese franc
and the evolution of the Rwandese domestic price level (consumer price index, cpi). Notice
that a depreciation of the Rwandese franc implies, in the short run, an increase in revenues
for the dictator. He can be considered as an exporter who purchases power in terms of
loyalty and repression on the domestic market. The inﬂationary eﬀects of depreciations
on the domestic markets are taken into account by considering also the evolution of the
general domestic price level in the comparisons below.
The evolution of the main determinants to convert the world coﬀee price in terms of
purchasing power can be found in columns 2 (the nominal coﬀee price on the world market
in dollar cents), 3 (the exchange rate) and 4 (the consumer price index), of table 2, for the
period 1985-1993.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































13International coﬀee prices expressed in us dollars declined throughout the period, with
the exceptions of 1986 and 1988, when the world price increased due to bad harvests in
Brazil, and a relatively small upshot at the end of the observation period, in 1993. The
steady increase of the domestic price level aggravated the negative repercussions of the
falling international coﬀee price on the dictator’s budget. The mild depreciation of the
Rwandese franc vis-` a-vis the dollar towards the end of the eighties, and the considerable
devaluations of 1990 and 1992 could not reverse the global downward tendency of the
world coﬀee price expressed in constant rwf (column 6 of table 2): while the price per kg
in 1985 amounted to 138 constant 1975 rwf, it declined to a meagre 48 constant 1975 rwf
in 1993, despite the relatively small upshots, also in real terms, in 1986, 1988, 1991 and
1993. The latter two were caused by the devaluations of 1990 and 1992 and the higher
world price in dollars in 1993.
In nominal terms, the domestic producer price (see column 1 of table 2) was raised
from 120 rwf in 1985 to 125 rwf in 1987. However, in real terms, the domestic prices
continued to decline almost without any interruption over the whole period 1985-1993,
from 51 constant 1975 rwf in 1985 to 30 constant 1975 rwf in 1993 (see column 5 of
table 2). The only exception was the year 1986, when the increase in the domestic price
exceeded inﬂation.
The global picture therefore suggests that the international and the domestic coﬀee price
are positively associated. The regime was confronted with a declining revenue from coﬀee
and reacted by price cuts, thereby buying less loyalty. As a consequence, the production of
coﬀee became less attractive and the volume of coﬀee produced steadily declined (column 8
of table 2). Many farmers were not anymore interested in growing coﬀee. Some farmers
preferred to grow other crops, e.g. bananas. Bananas and especially banana beer are
important sources of peasant income (see Bart, 1993). Compared to coﬀee, bananas are a
source of income the whole year round, with a dense local market for banana beer. Survey
research in 1992 suggested that a minimum price of 120 rwf/kg was necessary for farmers
to continue cultivation. At 115 rwf, 5 percent of the farmers stated that they would stop
coﬀee cultivation. At 100 rwf, 10 percent would do so (Tardif-Douglin et al., 1993).
Tardif-Douglin et al. (1993) write that a bag of coﬀee would buy the Rwandese farmer
in 1991 only half the goods it bought in 1980. This ﬁgure was conﬁrmed by our own calcu-
lations, which indicate a drop from 70 constant 1975 rwf in 1980 to 37 constant 1975 rwf
in 1991. It was this drop in the real price of coﬀee that made its cultivation not anymore
interesting to the farmer. The negative evolution of coﬀee production was exacerbated by
14the crop failure in the southern prefectures of Gikongoro and Butare in 1989, due to plant
disease and drought, with, as a consequence, a serious dip in the coﬀee production during
that year.
The downward trend in both real world and domestic coﬀee prices seemed to have been
ongoing already quite a while, be it less pronounced. From the same sources as those used
for table 1, we constructed a time series of constant 1975 rwf world and domestic coﬀee
prices going back to 1975, thus covering almost the whole period of the Habyarimana
regime. These series are plotted in ﬁgure 1. We ﬁtted a 3rd degree polynomial trend
through both series. For the estimated coeﬃcients, see the appendix.
Figure 1 permits three observations. First, the polynomial for the domestic coﬀee price,
which is reasonably well estimated given the limited number of observations (n = 19),
reaches its local maximum just before the ﬁfth period of observation (1979) and its local
minimum at about the eighteenth observation period (1992). So, the real domestic coﬀee
price had a downward trend from the late seventies onward up to almost the very end of
the Habyarimana regime. The international price trend, for which the estimate admittedly
was much less precise, declined throughout the observation period, up to 1992. So, overall
we observe a declining trend of the real world prices and the real producer price for coﬀee
in Rwanda since 1979.
Secondly, the gap between the international and domestic coﬀee price is strongly re-
duced towards the end of the observation period. This could also be seen from column 7 of
table 2, where we calculated the percentage of the world price which goes to the farmers.
From a ratio which roughly reached 40% in the early eighties, it suddenly rose to 60% and
more, with a maximum of 84% in 1989. This forced the regime into subsidizing the coﬀee
sector from the second half of the eighties onwards (see the last column of table 2). Part
of these subsidies presumably have been ﬁnanced by foreign aid and soft loans, the level of
which started to increase in that period. The World Development Indicators database for
Rwanda reveals that the oﬃcial development assistance (oda) rose from 208 million us dol-
lars in 1986 to 356 million us dollars in 199313. In real terms, this meant an increase of
resources by 91%, from 6969 constant 1975 rwf in 1986 to 13336 constant 1975 rwf
13These ﬁgures stem from www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2003/. oda comprises actual international
transfers of ﬁnancial resources or of goods and services. It contains grants by oﬃcial agencies of the
Development Assistance Committee members (22 major donor countries plus the European Commission)
and loans with a grant element of at least 25%. These are net ﬁgures: any repayments of principals have
been subtracted. The ﬁgures might give a slightly exaggerated picture, since grants in kind are expressed
at cost for the donor.
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16in 1993.
Thirdly, we observe that the trend lines conﬁrm the suggestion made earlier that world
and domestic coﬀee prices are positively associated. In terms of our model, the dictator
buys more loyalty to increase his power in budgetary favourable times, but he cuts his
expenditures on loyalty when his revenue is imploding, which was generally speaking the
case in Rwanda between 1979 and 1993. During the years 1975-1978 the raw data suggest
a positive association between real world and domestic prices, but the trend lines are
negatively correlated until 1979.
To investigate this relation further, we performed a nonparametric regression of the
real domestic on real international coﬀee price14. The result is represented in ﬁgure 2.
For the sake of facilitating the interpretation, we added the real observation points to the
graph. The positive relation throughout the range of values that the international price
level assumes from 1979 onwards is conﬁrmed. Contrary to what the negative correlation of
the trend lines during the early observation period suggested, this positive relation seems to
hold also for higher values of the international price, as, for example, those values observed
during that period (1975-1978). There is indeed a negative kink in the regression curve
for values of the international price level between 246 and 308 constant 1975 rwf. This
can be explained empirically, by the observation that the real international coﬀee price
declined from 285 constant 1975 rwf in 1976, to 229 constant 1975 rwf in 1978, while
the real domestic price rose during the same period from 61 to 87 constant 1975 rwf. But
this negative part of the graph is statistically not very reliable. Increasing the bandwidth
of the regression would eliminate the negative part from the graph and reveal a persistent
positive association throughout the observation period. We could have expected this, since
the ratio of yearly ﬁrst diﬀerences of real domestic to real international price is positive
for 1976-1975 through 1980-1979, including the observations for 1978-1977 and 1977-1976.
We can conclude that there is statistical evidence for a positive sign of the derivative of the
real domestic price w.r.t. the real world price of coﬀee, in Rwanda during the Habyarimana
regime.
Some point observations (revert to ﬁgure 1) do not ﬁt with the global picture of a
positive association between world and domestic coﬀee prices. These are all situated in
14One-dimensional nonparametric regression is a technique which allows for testing the sign of association
between two variables in a functionally independent way. Admittedly, the technique is designed in the
ﬁrst place for analysis of larger data-sets. So the present regression should be interpreted with care.
Technicalities can be found in H¨ ardle (1990). We used a bandwidth of :75
5 p
n times the (estimated) standard
deviation of the world price in constant 1975 rwf.
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18years of small upshots in the international price expressed in real terms (1981, 1984, 1988,
1991, 1993), while the global trend is already declining, from 1978 onwards. Apparently,
these did not suﬃce to convince the regime to raise simultaneously the farmers’ purchasing
power. Only the peak in 1986, during the Brazil crisis, was passed on, be it only partly, to
the farmers. We interpret the exceptions as stochastic deviations from the global picture.
Possibly, the regime’s economic policy makers did expect that these upshots in the price
were only temporarily and therefore did not adapt the domestic price simultaneously.
In terms of our model, the globally positive association between world and domestic
coﬀee prices during the reign of the Habyarimana regime corresponds to what is described
in the second column of table 1 as either benevolent or totalitarian dictatorship. In the
next subsection, we will give some empirical evidence on the evolution of the level of
repression during the observation period, to determine which of both types of dictatorship
best characterizes the behaviour of the regime. In the meantime, we feel that the small
elasticity of the domestic coﬀee price with respect to the world price, alluded to earlier as
the second lesson from ﬁgure 1, gives at least an intuitive indication that buying loyalty, or
attempts to limit the decrease of the farmers’ purchasing power, was an important concern
for the Habyarimana regime.
3.3 Repression as a manifestation of benevolent dictatorship?
During the early years (1973-1979), the Habyarimana regime still had to establish itself
among the peasant masses (Uwezeyimana, 1996). Some classical dictatorial policy measures
were taken. In 1975, Habyarimana abolished all political parties and made all Rwandans
members of the mrnd (Mouvement R´ evolutionaire National pour le D´ eveloppement), the
single party. From then onwards, the mrnd would be used as a vehicle for distributing
political rents and to build mass loyalty. At least during the very ﬁrst years of our obser-
vation period, from 1975 to 1977, this coincided with a rise in the real international and
domestic coﬀee price. In our typology, such a dictator, who buys more loyalty as well as
more repression when the price of the export crop rises, was said to be totalitarian.
Towards the end of the seventies, the ﬁrst signs of repressive policies regarding the
coﬀee sector appeared (Little and Horowitz, 1987)15. The 1978 law on coﬀee cultivation,
for example, made the neglect of coﬀee trees punishable and provided every commune
15There is some discussion on the degree of force used by the authorities to promote coﬀee cultivation.
For this discussion, the reader can consult the comment by Robins and Ndoreyaho (1988) and Little and
Horowitz’s reply (1988).
19with a monitor to advise farmers and control their coﬀee cultivation. At that moment
the real international coﬀee price started to decline already, so that these measures can
be interpreted as some preliminary evidence on the emergence of a benevolent type of
dictatorship.
During the early eighties, there was however little pressure to apply these laws in
practice. From 1980 to 1985 the fall of the international coﬀee prices in real terms was
mild. As there was little political upheaval during that period, the regime exhibited a
tendency to cut its expenditures on loyalty, by letting the real prices decrease slightly,
without feeling the need to increase simultaneously the level of repression. This also ﬁts
into the picture of the behaviour of a benevolent dictator when tides are worsening. After
abandoning the ﬁxed exchange rate between the dollar and the rwf in 1983, a depreciation
of the Rwandese franc followed so that the real producer price could be kept relatively
stable, without a major impact on the government budget.
The picture started changing after 1986, when the world price in real terms collapsed.
However, as we noticed from ﬁgure 1 and column 7 of table 2, the elasticity of the domestic
price with respect to the international coﬀee price is small. Therefore, unless for other,
exogenous shocks, changes in the level of repression due to international price movements
can be expected to be very moderate or quasi nil. Some qualitative evidence suggests
an increase in the level of repression towards the end of the eighties16. We give a short
overview.
The reaction of the government to the crop failure in Gikongoro and Butare (1989) can
be seen as illustrative. The government, which had proclaimed food-self-suﬃciency to be
its prime policy objective, refused to recognize the existence of a famine. It tried to impose
a press black out (Prunier (1995): 87-88) and heavily criticized the journal Kinyamateka
for publishing photos of starving people.
In September 1990 three journalists and the editor of the same journal Kinyamateka
16Quantiﬁed measures of the political and civil rights status of countries were too rough to reg-
ister these micro changes. Moreover the results of those quantiﬁcations are sometimes questionable.
On the seven point scale for the civil right index distributed by the Freedom House (available from
www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/FHSCORES.xls) Rwanda scored 6 (7 is the worst case) over
the whole period from 1979 till 1992. Surprisingly, an improvement to score 5 is registered from 1992 to
1993, while this index comprises, amongst other things, the occurrence of war and insurgencies. Possibly,
the Arusha agreements might have inﬂuenced the score. Their political right index, which comprises mi-
nority rights, remained constant, at the high level of 6, throughout the period 1979-1993 despite ample
documentation by now of liquidations of Tutsi after the invasion of the rpf in October 1990 (cf. note 18
below).
20were brought before a court by the state for publishing a series of articles on the diversion
of public funds for food relief by government authorities in the second half of 1989, but
they were ﬁnally acquitted due to massive support of local people and international rights
organizations. During the the publication of the articles there was a lot of pressure on
the journalists (Amnesty International, 1990 and Sibomana, 1999)17. All this happened in
a climate of an oﬃcially announced political democratization of the regime. The regime
abandoned the one party state in June 1990. This fact could, at ﬁrst sight, be interpreted
as counter evidence of constant or increasing repression. But the decision to democratize
was taken under international pressure of some major donors, amongst them France, and
the regime was dependent on their aid to face the coﬀee crisis. Moreover, this decision
did not prevent the regime from increasing repression in the economic sector, and from
obstructing a free press and political opposition.
The situation became critical between 1988 and 1990, when the real world price declined
from 90 to 56 constant 1975 rwf. As a consequence, the regime lowered the domestic price
in 1990 from 125 to 100 rwf in nominal terms. This meant a decline to a level at which
10% of the farmers reported that they would rather destroy their coﬀee trees (cf. supra
and Tardif-Douglin, 1993), even though this was, strictly speaking, legally prohibited ac-
cording to the 1978 law. Some authors report that farmers actually did uproot their coﬀee
trees, in spite of the penalties (Uvin 1998, Willame 1995). Given the legal restrictions,
the percentage of farmers who would have uprooted their coﬀee trees in a less repressive
environment surely would have been higher.
Because of the farmers’ increasing reluctance in the late eighties to continue participat-
ing in umuganda – the unpaid communal labour duties which every adult had to perform
once a week – local party and state oﬃcials were driven to raise pressure in order to
be able to meet the national umuganda objectives stated by the regime’s central author-
ity (Guichaoua, (1991): 562). Prunier (1995: 87) claims that the number of umuganda
17The editor comments on the events as follows: “I knew that I was taking a risk by publishing these
articles. It was at that time that Father Sylvio Sindambiwe was killed and it was diﬃcult not to make
a linked between these two events. I also knew that I was exposing the whole editorial team to possible
retaliation. We accepted these risks.” (Sibomana, (1999): 25). Sylvio Sindambiwe was a former editor in
chief of that newspaper, who had to resign in December 1985 under pressure of Archbishop Nsengiyumva,
who was closely related to the Habyarimana regime, after he was directing the newspaper to adopt a
critical line towards the Habyarimana regime. He escaped two earlier assassination attempts since then,
and died in a suspect traﬃc accident on November 7th 1989. Another suspect death in a ‘traﬃc accident’
in August of the same year, of a member of parliament known for her open criticism of those corrupt
government practices was reported by Prunier (1995: 89)
21tasks were also increased by the regime during that period.
The coercive policy measures as a means to safeguard power while the loyalty from the
peasantry began to fade due to the lowering of the domestic price (see previous subsec-
tion), could be interpreted as the reaction of a benevolent dictator to the disadvantageous
economic environment in the late eighties, when the world coﬀee prices were falling. It is
impossible to distinguish empirically for that period between constrained and pure benev-
olence (see note 9).
Finally, the repression got into a new phase after the civil war started with the invasion
of the rpf in October 1990. The regime tried to reassure support by stirring up nationalist
feelings and deviating attention from unfavourable economic conditions. As a part of
the programme to stimulate hostile feelings against Tutsi, the training of unemployed
youth as militias started. The increase in political repression is amply documented by the
1993 report of the international inquiry commission on the violations of human rights in
Rwanda: arbitrary arrest, killing of opposition members by government agents, several
massacres against Tutsi, conﬁscation of property, rape, etc.18
What is less known, but can be derived from the ﬁgures, is that the repressive policies of
the early nineties have been ﬁnanced at least partly by the successive devaluations of 1990
and 1992. The years following the devaluations (1991 and 1993) were indeed exceptional in
that an increase in the international coﬀee price expressed in constant 1975 rwf due to the
devaluation was followed by an increase in the level of repression combined with a continued
18Several reports were written on gross human rights violations in Rwanda during the 1990-93 period.
All these reports implicated the national and local authorities in the organization of the killings of Tutsi.
(1) International Commission on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda since October 1st 1990 (F´ ederation
Internationale des Droits de l’Homme (fidh), et al., March 1993). This report implicates the highest
authorities in the organization of the killing of 2.000 Tutsi in several locations throughout Rwanda. The
report also observes that L´ eon Mugesera, a close friend of Habyarimana and one of the ideologists of the
genocide, was the instigator of this ﬁrst massacre (fidh, et al., (1993): 21). Two years later, in 1992,
Mugesera would make a racist speech inciting his audience to kill Tutsi.
(2) The us Department of State (February, 1993) published a report detailing the massacres of Tutsi in
Bugesera (March 1992) and Bagogwe, a Tutsi subgroup (January 1991). In March 1991 the us Department
of State had already published a report on the January 1991 massacre.
(3) In December 1992 and December 1993, the Rwandese human rights group adl (Association rwandaise
pour la d´ efense des Droits de la personne et des Libert´ es publiques) published reports detailing massacres
and human rights violations against Tutsi.
(4) The un special rapporteur’s report on Rwanda was released in August 1993. It says that massacres
fall under the treaty deﬁnition of genocide.
22reduction of the real domestic coﬀee price, be it at a lower rate than before19. In those
exceptional years, the Habyarimana regime exhibited tyrannical traits. But these point
observations can of course not overrule the global picture which is the one of a benevolent
dictatorship. Recall that benevolent dictators substitute loyalty by repression when their
revenues from exports are falling due to international price declines. The situation seemed
to have been exacerbated by the success of the regime in obtaining external ﬁnancial means
(soft loans and aid) till its very end. This engendered positive income eﬀects and made it
therefore possible to raise the level of repression, while letting the real domestic price fall
less rapidly than the world price.
4 Conclusion
We presented a political economy model of dictatorship in a single export crop economy.
With the export earnings, the dictator buys the loyalty of the farmers-producers of the
export crop by setting the price paid to producers. The diﬀerence between this price
and the world market price, the revenue of the dictator, is used to pay for a repressive
apparatus. Foreign aid or debt ﬁnancing provide additional budgetary resources. Changes
in the world market price of the crop aﬀect the producer price and the level of repression.
The sign of these eﬀects depends on the magnitude of the income and substitution eﬀects
of the producer price and repression in the production of power and on their eﬀect on the
volume of coﬀee produced.
The model suggests a taxonomy of dictatorial behaviour. A benevolent dictator, for
example, relies on buying more loyalty and substituting repression by loyalty to stay in
power, when the international price of the export crop increases. The reverse or ‘bad’ side
of a benevolent dictator pops up when he faces worsening economic circumstances: the
level of repression is (weakly) increased, and he reduces his expenditures on loyalty by
reducing the producer price.
We used our model to explain the political economy of coﬀee in Rwanda under Habyari-
mana who ruled the country from 1973 to 1994. The observed facts on the evolution of the
international coﬀee price, the domestic coﬀee price and the level of repression in Rwanda
illustrate the functioning of the model. What we have analyzed here is the behaviour of
a dictator who tried to found his power on the loyalty of the peasant population. He had
19In 1991 the government increased the nominal price from 100 to 115 rwf, but this could not compensate
for the inﬂation rate of 19.6%.
23to conduct this policy in an era when the world coﬀee price was declining. The logic of
benevolent dictatorship led him to cut on expenditures on loyalty and, eventually, to turn
to an increase in the level of repression from the end of the eighties onwards. The success
of the regime to raise alternative revenues in the form of foreign aid and soft loans allowed
it to raise the repression, and to mitigate the negative pressure on the domestic price.
24Appendix
Comparative statics
Diﬀerentiation of the system of ﬁrst order conditions (6:a), (6:b) and the budget con-
straint (3), repeated here in full form as:
¼pp ¡ ¸
³










pRR ¡ (pm ¡ pp)K(pp;R) ¡ M = 0;
(A.1)











































where v1 and v2 are the virtual costs or shadow prices of pp and R respectively, deﬁned in
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All functions of pp and R are evaluated in the optimal point (the solution to the system of
equations A.1).
In the sequel, the matrix ¡H(v1;v2)) will be abbreviated by the expression U. Hence,






























25Using the formulas for an inverse of the sum of two matrices (see f.e. Henderson and Searle,











with I3, the 3-dimensional unit matrix.
We ﬁrst consider the matrix (H(¼))












By deﬁnition, we have:
(H(¼))
¡1 H(¼) = I3; (A.8)
from which it follows that:
Z11v1 + Z12v2 = 0; (A.9a)
Z21v1 + Z22v2 = 0: (A.9b)
These are known in consumer theory as the homogeneity conditions (see e.g. Barten and
B¨ ohm, 1982), and are used in the proof of the proposition below. It can furthermore be
shown that Z11;Z22 < 0 and Z12 = Z21 > 0. The symmetry (Z12 = Z21) follows from the
assumption of twice continuous diﬀerentiability of ¼, which implies that H(¼) is symmetric,
and so is its inverse. Consequently, from the homogeneity conditions (A.9a) and (A.9b) it
follows that Z11v1 + Z21v2 = 0 and Z12v1 + Z22v2 = 0 also hold. The sign of the Zij’s then
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2 : (v1;v2)¢x = 0 and x 6= 0; (strong quasi-concavity).









































is symmetric due to twice continuous diﬀerentiability of ¼;







Positivity of Z12 and Z21 follows then from homogeneity and positivity of the shadow
costs.
Furthermore, from general consumer theory (Barten and B¨ ohm, 1982), it is possible to
derive that the elements ¸Zij, i;j 2 f1;2g are equal to pure substitution eﬀects, while the
zi’s represent income eﬀects, for an optimization problem in which the virtual prices, v1
and v2, and the global budget B ´ M + pmK(pp;R) are considered to be parametric. By




s.t. B = v1pp + v2R:
(max’)







































We now concentrate ﬁrst on the structure of the solution of our own problem for the
income eﬀects (the partial derivatives of pp and R w.r.t. M). Since it was shown that
the inverse of H(¼) + ¸U could be written as a sum of (H(¼))
¡1 and another matrix, the































27That is, the income eﬀect can be split up in two parts: the ﬁrst is the classical income eﬀect
from consumer theory, and an indirect eﬀect, which takes into account that the reaction
of pp and R due to an increase in M, induces an additional income eﬀect because of the
associated change in coﬀee production, which alters the budget constraint through the























That is, the traditional income eﬀect equals the eﬀect of a change in the budget on pp
and R, keeping coﬀee production constant. We will make the assumption of bi-normality
(cf. Moulin, 1995, p.357), which states that this direct income eﬀect is positive, both for
pp and R. The terms q1 and q2 then capture the additional, indirect, income eﬀect that
works through pmK(pp;R).
Putting things together, we can now calculate the complete eﬀect of changing interna-


























































An increase in the international coﬀee price provokes in the ﬁrst place a direct income eﬀect
on both pp and R. Indeed, it has the same eﬀect as raising the other budgetary means M,
through the term pmK(pp;R). Under the assumption of bi-normality, these income eﬀects
are positive. From the expressions for the shadow cost of coﬀee price and repression, v1
and v2 (see equations 4:1 and 4:2 in the main text), it can be seen that a change in the
international prices has also a direct negative eﬀect on those shadow prices, since v1 and
v2 are a function of pm: we obtain that
@v1
@pm = ¡ @K
@pp < 0 and
@v2
@pm = ¡@K
@R < 0. This induces
a double substitution eﬀect. The ﬁrst, ‘own’ substitution eﬀects contain the eﬀect on pp,
respectively R, of this decline in the own shadow cost, v1, respectively v2. This decline














= ¸Z22 < 0, which were shown to be negative, lead to an increase of both R and pp.
On the other hand the ‘cross’ substitution eﬀects reﬂect the change in pp, respectively R,














¸Z21 > 0, those cross substitution eﬀects are negative. This means that the global eﬀect of
changing international prices on domestic price, pp, and the level of repression, R, cannot
be signed a priori. We classify the possible types of dictatorial behaviour the model allows
in the main text.
Moreover, the shadow prices v1, v2 and the budgetary means are functions of the level
of domestic coﬀee prices, pp, and, repression, R. Consequently, the direct reaction in pp
and R to a change in international coﬀee prices, cause second round eﬀects, which are
reﬂected in the three last terms of both equations. The terms with Qij reﬂect the second
round eﬀects of changes in v1 and v2 due to variations in the ﬁrst round of pp and R.
Secondly, the terms qiK(pp;R) denote the indirect income eﬀects, which act through a
change in the coﬀee production C = K(pp;R), following the ﬁrst round eﬀects on pp and
R. We were not able to sign these eﬀects. We assume that these are small in absolute
value, in a sense speciﬁed more precisely in the main text (see equations (11:1) and (11:2)
and the consequent comments). Therefore, we denote the sum of these indirect second
round eﬀects in a more condensed way by the symbols w1, respectively w2. After this
substitution, equations (A.14a) and (A.14b) result in equations (8) and (9) of the main
text. It can be seen from equation (A.6) that the non-dominating character of these terms
will be satisﬁed, if the terms of the matrix U are small in absolute value. This will mainly
be the case, when the eﬀects of pp and R on coﬀee production, reﬂected in the partial
derivatives of the production function K, are small.
There are a number of arguments to support this assumption. It takes three to ﬁve years
after planting before coﬀee trees reach full production. Regenerated coﬀee ﬁelds, also, do
not reach full production in the year of regeneration. An increase in the price oﬀered
to producers may only result in an increase in the volume produced a few years later.
Therefore, a government must be able to credibly commit itself that it will pay a higher
price over a number of years. This is very diﬃcult for a dictator who uses repression when
he sees ﬁt. Increased repression may uphold the volume of output for some time. It will
also keep the dictator in power for some time, but it does not yield any additional income
for the farmer-producers. This means that, in the end, the eﬀect of pp on C (the volume
produced) depends on the credibility of a country’s institutions to guarantee the income
of farmer-producers. Given the knowledge and experience of producers that the dictator is
willing and ready to use repression to reach his objectives, the credibility of a price policy
for coﬀee under dictatorship is low and the assumption of small eﬀects of pp and R on C
29is not unrealistic.
Proof of the proposition
Proof. Recall that
@pp























































After rewriting the condition for @R
@pm ¸ 0 in a similar way as (use homogeneity condition




























¸ 0, it follows, under the








is always satisﬁed since the right hand side of condition (A.17) is non-positive, and the left
hand side is positive.
Putting things together leads to the claim 1 of the proposition. The second and third claim
are proven analogously.
Polynomial trend equations
The estimates of the coeﬃcients of the 3th degree polynomial trends represented in ﬁgure 1
are equal to (t-statistics between brackets):
ˆ pp = 0:035 t3 ¡ 1:188 t2 + 9:113 t + 53:196;
(1:768) (¡1:990) (1:750) (4:311)
R
2 = 0:6821 R 2 = 0:6186;
(A.19)
30and:
ˆ pm = 0:084 t3 ¡ 2:336 t2 + 3:714 t + 253:240;
(0:867) (¡0:795) (0:145) (4:168)
R
2 = 0:7059 R 2 = 0:6471:
(A.20)
The ﬁt is reasonable for both equations, while the precision of the domestic price equation
is acceptable, given the limited amount of observations (n = 19). The precision for the
international price equation is however very poor. We therefore also estimated a 4th degree
polynomial for the world coﬀee price. The ﬁt increases signiﬁcantly (in terms of adjusted
R2), and the precision amounts to the same level as for the 3-th degree equation for the
domestic price. We nevertheless prefer the 3-th degree polynomial for interpretational
purposes, since it performs better at the end of period, which is of most interest to us.
Moreover, its results are more in line with the non-parametric regression in ﬁgure 2.
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